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Abstract—In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical
formulation for a specific form of collaborative industrial relations
called “Industrial Symbiotic Relation (ISR) games” and provide
a formal framework to model, verify, and support collaboration
decisions in this new class of two-person operational games.
ISR games are formalized as cooperative cost-allocation games
with the aim to allocate the total ISR-related operational cost
to involved industrial firms in a fair and stable manner by
taking into account their contribution to the total traditional
ISR-related cost. We tailor two types of allocation mechanisms
using which firms can implement cost allocations that result in
a collaboration that satisfies the fairness and stability properties.
Moreover, while industries receive a particular ISR proposal, our
introduced methodology is applicable as a managerial decision
support to systematically verify the quality of the ISR in question.
This is achievable by analyzing if the implemented allocation
mechanism is a stable/fair allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The multi-dimensional concept of Industrial Symbiosis
focuses on analysis, design, and operation of collaborative re-
lations between traditionally disjoint industrial enterprises with
the aim of keeping reusable resources, e.g., recyclable material
or waste energy, in their (loosely connected) value chains [1–
3]. As Industrial Symbiotic Relations (ISRs) aim at the lowest
possible discharge of resources, they can be considered as a
tool for implementing the concept of circular economy [4] in
the context of industrial relations. Moreover, ISRs are closely
related to Industry 4.0 paradigm and practice of Collaborative
Networked Organizations as they all are concerned about the
necessity for interrelation between traditionally disconnected
industrial firms [5, 6]. Reviewing industrial symbiosis litera-
ture, we encounter recent contributions focused on different
aspects of this concept. In [3], they present the concept of
perfect industrial symbiosis and verify the quality of any given
ISR by measuring its distance to such a perfect form. Intro-
duced method in [7] focuses on efficiency measuring while
[8] studies dynamics of profits in ISRs. Despite contributions
that discuss static (multi-criteria) decision analysis in industrial
symbiosis (see [9]), one aspect of ISRs that we believe requires
more attention is dynamic decision analysis. In our view, while
we shift from ISR in theory to ISR in practice, two missed
elements are 1) applicable decision analysis methods and 2)
practical decision support tools that are aware of dynamic
operational aspects of ISRs, e.g., methods for analyzing and
mechanisms for designing fair and stable collaborations. This
asks for formal frameworks tailored to model, verify, and sup-
port such decisions (i.e., decision process modeling, decisions
verification methods, and decision support tools). In a general
view, decisions in ISRs can be categorized in two classes,
selection decisions and collaboration decisions. The former is
about choosing among firms and learning about potential ISRs
(exploration) while the latter is about getting engaged in (or
rejecting) a particular ISR proposal (exploitation). To deal with
these two operational decision problems, the mature field of
of cooperative game theory [10] and more specifically subfield
of Operations Research (OR) games [11] provide vigorous
analytical methods and design mechanisms.
In this work, we aim to fill the gap by tailoring analytical
tools based on game-theoretical solution concepts to support
the second form of decisions, i.e., collaboration decisions, in
ISRs. For this purpose, we represent ISRs as market games and
model them as cooperative cost-allocation games (see [12, 13]).
Accordingly, the focus is on operational aspects of ISRs,
analysis of collaboration decisions in ISRs, and tailoring cost-
allocation mechanisms that respect the operation of ISRs. Note
that in this work we analyze collaboration decisions in bilateral
industrial symbiotic relations as the nuclear building blocks
for various industrial symbiotic topologies, e.g., Industrial
Symbiotic Networks (ISNs) [14].
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we provide
a conceptual analysis of ISRs from an operational point of
view. Section III presents the game-theoretical preliminaries
and our proposed class of ISR games. In Sections IV we
introduce the two tailored solution concepts for allocation of
costs in ISRs. Using these notions, firms can reason about
stability and fairness of any given ISR. Finally, concluding
remarks and future work directions are presented in Section
V.
II. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
To discuss the intuition behind our proposed operational
semantics for the game-theoretical formulation of Industrial
Symbiotic Relations (ISRs) and to elaborate nuances of col-
laboration decisions in ISRs, we present the following running
example. Imagine a glass manufacturer firm A and a ceramics
manufacturer firm B. Firm A produces glass powder as its
excess resource r that (after recycling) can be substituted with
i, the primary input of B for its production processes (Figure
1).
A B
Traditional
i-Supplier
r-Discharge
Area
r (to substitute i)r i
Fig. 1. Schematic industrial symbiotic relation between (glass manufacturer)
firm A and (ceramics manufacturer) firm B on resource r (glass powder).
A. Collaboration Decision and Cost-Allocation
In our ISR example, having the potential to form a sym-
biotic relation over r may enable both A and B to reduce
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the costs affiliated with discharging excess r (7 units of util1)
and purchasing i (11 units of util), respectively. However,
establishing such a collaboration has its corresponding oper-
ational costs, e.g., costs of transportation and recycling (15
units of util). Intuitively, such an ISR would be feasible if
total traditional costs in case of non-cooperation (7 + 11 utils)
be more than total operational costs in case of cooperation
(15 utils). Such a feasibility condition is necessary but not
sufficient for firms to collaborate. One main question is about
the method(s) to allocate the operational costs of collaboration
such that the contribution of each party will be respected.
Should both firms A and B equally pay (7.5 utils) or should
firm B pay more as it is enjoying more cost reduction
thanks to the collaboration? Although the collaboration may
reduce the total cost, how to allocate the total cost of ISR
operationalization will be at stake. This relates the practice of
ISRs to the concept of coopetition [15] in which the players
are interested in cooperation but also compete to gain as much
as possible out of the benefits created by such a cooperation.
Accordingly, studying if an ISR is a stable and fair relation
calls for methods to analyze and mechanisms to guarantee its
performance in the operationalization stage.
B. Dynamics of ISR-Related Costs
Following [16], we deem that economic profitability can
be seen as the main driver for industries to get involved in a
potential ISR (collaboration decision). In brief, for firms with
the potential to establish an ISR, it is reasonable to compare
the total cost of ISR-operationalization with their current ISR-
related costs, e.g., excess-resource discharge costs. Note that
we circumscribe our focus on costs that can be reduced or
costs that will be introduced, in case of ISR materialization
and not the costs that remain uninfluenced, e.g., costs related
to processes that are independent of the ISR in question. In the
following, we provide a brief cost analysis for firms on both
sides of a potential ISR. This results in two classes of ISR-
related operational and traditional costs. The former refers to
costs involved in the process of ISR operationalization while
the latter is about traditional costs that firms should take into
account if they do not implement the ISR.
In our example, firm B should traditionally purchase i from
its i-supplier(s) and firm A has to pay the cost of discharging r.
We call the former, traditional purchasing cost and the latter,
traditional discharge cost. On the other hand, the three main
ISR-related operational costs are Treatment, Transportation,
and Transaction costs [17, 18]. Treatment Cost: When a re-
source based on which an ISR can be established, e.g., glass
powder, is out of a production process, it needs to be treated.
Depending on the resource type, treatment processes may
include sorting, dismantling, liquefaction, etc. [19, 20]. Based
on the set of treatment processes required to make the resource
usable for the resource-receiver side of an ISR, the imple-
mentation of waste treatment facility may change. In general,
the treatment process results in a total treatment cost for any
particular ISR. Transportation Cost: Resource transportation
can be done via land vehicles, sea freights, or even combined
transportation modes (see [21]) with respect to the resource
type and geographical boundaries. Moreover, potential partners
1A util can be any sort of transferable utility, e.g., say that each util is one
thousand Euros.
may decide to invest in implementation of new infrastructures,
e.g., a pipeline system, and paying the investment cost for this.
In this work, we abstract from such subtleties in decision-
making for the mode of transportation and assume a standard
total transportation cost for a given ISR. Transaction Cost:
The role of transaction costs in establishment of ISRs is
studied in the industrial symbiosis literature, e.g., in [22, 23].
According to [24, 25], transaction costs include the costs of
market research, contracting negotiations, coordination, and
adapting to the use of non-traditional resources, e.g., wastes.
As discussed, the former two operational costs are very much
dependent on the resource type while the transaction cost
merely depends on the administrative aspects of the ISR.
As we are focused on industrial symbiotic relations (and not
networks), we take into account a single value for transaction
cost for a given ISR.
In this work, we consider the two classes of ISR-related
operational and traditional costs as the main quantitative pa-
rameters for our game-theoretical formalization of ISRs. This
is to tailor mechanisms for allocation of ISR-related opera-
tional costs based on the contribution of the involved firms
to ISR-related traditional costs. For notational convenience,
while discussing about a given industrial symbiotic relation σ
between two arbitrary firms A and B, we denote the total σ-
related traditional costs for the firm i ∈ {A,B} with Ti(σ¯)
and refer to total σ-related operational costs as T (σ). So, the
aim is to allocate T (σ) to both A and B in a stable and fair
manner by taking into account TA(σ¯) and TB(σ¯). We later
discuss about and distinguish between stability and fairness of
cost-allocations in ISRs.
C. Game-Theoretical Cost-Allocation Mechanisms
As we discussed in Section II-A, allocation mechanisms
can play a key role in the process of ISR operationalization
since a fair allocation of operational costs can foster the collab-
oration. For developing such practical allocation mechanisms,
cooperative game theory [10] and Operation Research (OR)
games [11] provide theoretical solution concepts to allocate
costs to involved players in market games. Notions such
as core of the game and Shapley value guarantee desired
properties such that it is reasonable for firms not to deviate
from cooperation [10]. In the following, we briefly analyze
properties of these two types of game-theoretical solution
concepts as two notions that we aim to tailor for allocation
of the total operational cost in ISRs.
We first discuss the concept of core of the game as the
set of all cost-allocations that (1) allocate a cost to each
player lower than their traditional cost and (2) guarantee that
the total allocated cost is equal to the total operational cost.
In our ISR example, the total ISR-related operational cost
is 15 utils while firms A and B had to traditionally pay 7
and 11 utils, respectively. In this case, cooperation results
in total cost reduction by 3 utils. However, cooperating will
be rational for each player, only if they individually pay
less than what they had to pay traditionally. When a cost-
allocation mechanism satisfies this, it regards the so called
individual rationality (INR) property [13]. On the other hand,
the summation of allocated costs to players should be equal
to the total operational cost. Mechanisms that satisfy this
property, are called efficient (EFF) cost-allocations. The set
of cost allocations that satisfy both INR and EFF form
the core of the game [10]. The second game-theoretic notion
for allocation of costs, is the concept of Shapley value [26]
as the unique efficient (EFF) mechanism for allocation of a
cost among players such that (1) symmetric players pay the
same costs, (2) players that their presence in the cooperation
results in no cost reduction (referred as dummy players)
pay their traditional costs, and (3) if players get involved
in another game, the total allocated costs to each player in
these two games, can be simply added. These three properties
respectively referred to symmetry (SYM), dummy/null player
(DUM), and additivity (ADD) properties in the cooperative
game theory literature [10]. Note that Shapley value is the
unique mechanism that allocates a cost value to each player
such that all EFF , SYM , DUM , and ADD are satisfied.
III. INDUSTRIAL SYMBIOTIC RELATIONS AS GAMES
Dynamics of costs and cost-saving values that result from
collaboration in market games are often modeled by coopera-
tive games with Transferable Utility (TU) games [10, 12]. Such
games specify all the possible collaborative agent groups and
represent the corresponding cost values. This formal represen-
tation enables reasoning about cost-saving as a quantitative
outcome of cooperation among agents.
Definition 1 (Cooperative TU Games). [10] A cooperative
cost-allocation game with transferable utility (a TU game) is
a tuple (N, c) where N = {a1, a2, . . . , an} is the finite set of
agents and c : 2N 7→ R≥0 is a characteristic cost function that
associates a real number c(S) with each subset S ⊆ N . By
convention, we always assume that c(∅) = 0.
In the following definition, we recall two properties that
axiomatize the behavior of the cost function in response to
structural relations between agent groups.
Definition 2 (Subadditive and Submodular Games). [10]
Let G = (N, c) be a cost-allocation TU game. We say G
is subadditive iff c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ) for all disjoint
agent groups S and T in N (i.e., S, T ⊆ N and S ∩ T = ∅).
Moreover, we say G is submodular iff c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪
T ) + c(S ∩ T ) for all agent groups S and T in N (i.e.,
S, T ⊆ N ).
Roughly speaking, in subadditive games, agents have ra-
tional incentives to cooperate because the total cost will be
higher in case of no-cooperation. In most applications, cost-
allocation games are usually subadditive. Desirable properties
of submodular games (also referred as concave games) will
be elaborated while we focus on cost allocation mechanisms
for TU games (in Section IV).
With respect to our scope of application, i.e., bilateral
symbiotic relations between industrial agents, we focus on
two-person TU games and formalize our Industrial Symbiotic
Relation (ISR) games as such. Moreover, following our pre-
sented analysis in Section II-A about the feasibility of ISRs (in
case they result in the reduction of the total cost), we assume
subadditivity as it corresponds to the nature of our application
context.
Definition 3 (ISR Games). Let σ be an ISR between firms
A and B. Moreover, let T (σ) and Ti(σ¯) respectively represent
the total σ-related operational cost and the total σ-related
traditional costs for i ∈ {A,B}. We say σ-based ISR cost
allocation game (ISR game σ) between firms A and B is a
subadditive cooperative TU-game (N, c) where N = {A,B},
c(N) = T (σ), c(∅) = 0, and c({i}) = Ti(σ¯) for i ∈ N .
According to Definition 3, the cost function of ISR games
characterizes industrial symbiotic relations by associating to
each singleton group {i}2, the total cost that they will face
(individually) in case of no-cooperation. Moreover, it ascribes
the total ISR-related operational cost to the two member group
N as the amount that members of N have to pay (collectively)
in case of cooperation. In addition, the assumed subadditivity
of ISR games reflects the feasibility of ISRs, i.e., in ISR
games we have that T (σ) ≤ ∑
i∈N
Ti(σ¯). So, regardless of
the mechanisms for the allocation of ISR-related operational
costs, the total amount to be paid in case of cooperation is at
most equal to the sum of the amounts to be paid individually.
The following property shows that in general, ISR games are
submodular regardless of their particular settings. We later
discuss that such a property results in applicability of a large
class of game-theoretical cost allocation mechanisms, i.e.,
mechanisms that are based on the concept of core of the game.
Proposition 1 (Submodularity of ISR Games). Let σ be an
arbitrary ISR game. It always holds that σ is submodular.
Proof: According to Definition 2, a game is submodular
iff the c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ) + c(S ∩ T ) inequality holds
for all possible agent groups S and T in N . In ISR games,
by checking the validity of this inequality for all 6 possible
combinations of agent groups (for S and T ), the claim will
be proved. For S = ∅, we have the following valid inequality
c(∅)+c(T ) ≥ c(∅∪T = T )+c(∅). For S = N , the inequality
can be reformulated in the following form that always holds
c(N)+c(T ) ≥ c(N ∪T = N)+c(N ∩T = T ). Finally, when
S and T are equal to the only two possible disjoint groups,
we have the following inequality c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(N) + c(∅).
This inequality always holds thanks to the subadditivity of ISR
games.
Note that submodularity is not a general property of
subadditive cooperative games but holds for the class of ISR
games. In the following, we recall our ISR scenario between
the glass manufacturer firm A and the ceramics manufacturer
firm B, and describe the game-theoretical formulation of this
scenario.
Example 1 (ISR Scenario as a Game). In the ISR scenario
from section II, we assume that the amount of recycled excess
r in A completely substitutes the required amount of i in B.
Hence, in case the firms operationalize this symbiotic relation,
neither of the firms has to deal with associated traditional costs
for discharging excess r and purchasing required i. This ISR
scenario can be modeled as cooperative game σ = (N, c)
where N = {A,B}, c(A) = 7, c(B) = 11, c(∅) = 0, and
c(N) = 15. This game is both subadditive and submodu-
lar. To check subadditivity, we survey all possible couples
of agent groups in N . The only two disjoint agent groups
are {A} and {B} for which the cost of the union group
2In further references, whenever it is clear from the context that we are
referring to a singleton group {i} ⊂ N , we use i instead of {i}.
(c({A,B}) = c(N) = 15) is lower than the summation of
the individual costs (c({A}) + c({B}) = 18). Thus, the game
σ is subadditive. For submodularity, we can rely on Proposition
1.
IV. ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AND DECISION SUPPORT
Having Industrial Symbiotic Relations (ISRs) modeled as
cooperative games (ISR games), one decision that firms are
faced with is either “to get engaged in” or “to reject” a
potential ISR. This is mainly to determine the collaboration
decision (as discussed in Section II-A). Following rational
decision-making perspectives presented in [27, page. 210-211],
we deem that to support the collaboration decision in ISRs,
analyzing two key aspects of collaborations, namely stability
and fairness, results in practical decision support tools for
ISRs. In other words, “goodness” of a collaboration can be
characterized and validated by checking if it is stable, fair,
or both. In the following, we introduce two methods from
game-theoretical literature that axiomatize the stability and
fairness properties. These methods formulate both the stability
and fairness of collaborations with respect to distribution of
the value that agents can gain thanks to the collaboration.
Accordingly, tailoring these mechanisms for ISR games leads
to tools for supporting the collaboration decision in industrial
symbiotic relations. In this case, the way that industrial agents
allocate the total ISR-related operational cost specifies the
stability and fairness of the ISR.
A. Core Allocations for ISR Games
Core-based mechanisms in cooperative games are mainly
concerned about stability of possible collaborations [10]. In
relation to cost allocation in games, a collaboration is stable
iff (1) the summation of allocated costs to individual agents
in a collaborative group is equal to the total cost that the
group should pay (efficiency) and (2) the allocated costs to
individuals is at most equal to their costs in case they defect
from the collaborative group (rationality). It is observable that
if the agent groups follow a cost allocation method that does
not satisfy the two above properties, they end in an unstable
situation either due to inefficient distribution of costs or as the
result of (rational) agents leaving the group. In the following,
we define our core-based cost allocation mechanism for ISR
games and describe its properties.
Definition 4 (Core Allocations for ISRs). Let σ be an ISR
game (as defined in Definition 3) between firms A and B.
The core of σ is the set Ψ(σ) := {〈TΨA (σ), TΨB (σ)〉} such
that for i ∈ {A,B} we have that (1) TΨi (σ) ∈ R≥0 (non-
negative valued), (2)
∑
i∈{A,B}
TΨi (σ) = T (σ) (efficient), and
(3) TΨi (σ) ≤ Ti(σ¯) (individually rational).
Following the discussion about stability of collaborations,
an ISR σ is stable with respect to the allocation of its
operationalization costs, if it implements a cost allocation that
belongs to the core of σ. Thus, the presented core allocation
for ISRs can be applied as (1) a mechanism for guaranteeing
the stability of an ISR (ISR design) and (2) as a verification
method to analyze if an ISR is stable (ISR assessment). The
set of core allocations for a given ISR, construct a segment
representable in two-dimensional space (see Figure 2). Due
TA(σ)
TB(σ)
T (σ)
T (σ)
α
γ
β
TB(σ¯)
UA(σ) TA(σ¯)
UB(σ)
{〈TΨA (σ), TΨB (σ)〉}
Fig. 2. Schematic core and Shapley allocations for ISR game σ: In this
diagram, allocated costs to firms A and B are illustrated on the horizontal
and vertical axes, respectively. Moreover, UA(σ) = T (σ)−TB(σ¯), UB(σ) =
T (σ)− TA(σ¯), and γ represents the Shapley allocation of the game Φ(σ).
to the linear formulation of ISRs’ core, computing the set of
stable allocations is not computationally expensive and can be
computed applying linear programming techniques to solve a
two-variable system of inequalities [28].
Two main concerns with respect to applicability of the
concept of core are about its existence and fairness. In other
words, is the set of core allocations a nonempty one and does
it always provide a fair distribution of costs among involved
firms in an ISR game? In the following, we first illustrate that
ISR games have a nonempty core and core allocations cannot
guarantee the fairness property. This motivates the introduction
of a fair cost allocation mechanism, i.e., a Shapley-based
allocation mechanism for ISR games.
Proposition 2 (Existence Property of Core of ISR Games).
Let Ψ(σ) be the core of ISR game σ between firms A and B.
It always holds that Ψ(σ) 6= ∅.
Proof: According to the Bondareva-Shapley theorem (as
described in [10]), submodular games have a nonempty core.
We already proved in Proposition 1 that ISR games are
submodular. Hence, we have that for any ISR game σ, the
core is not empty.
Note that the concept of core of the game, provides a set
of allocations that guarantee the stability of the collaboration.
Having a range of stable cost distributions is appropriate for
ISR scenarios in which firms are allowed to practice their
bargaining power (see [29]) in the negotiation process in
order to pay the smallest possible share of the ISR-related
operational costs. E.g., as illustrated in Figure 2, the most
desirable (albeit stable) allocation form for firms A and B
occurs in points α and β, respectively. For instance in α,
firm A enjoys paying the lowest stable share of the total ISR-
related operational cost while B is paying the highest. In this
case, B suffers because of this intuitively unfair allocation
and pays equal to its total traditional cost. This shows that the
concept of core provides a method to verify the stability of an
ISR and can be applied as a tool to support the collaboration
decision in ISRs, i.e., accepting an out of core cost-distribution
results in an unstable ISR. Nevertheless, it does not grasp the
fairness and neither provides a method for choosing a specific
cost allocation to implement among the set of stable cost
allocations. In the following, we tailor a solution concept that
axiomatize the concept of fairness and provides a single-point
allocation that satisfies the fairness property.
B. Shapley Allocation for ISR Games
Regarding the allocation of costs in collaborative groups,
there exist various interpretations of the complex notion of
fairness (see [30]). In cooperative game theory, the well-
established concept of Shapley value [26] is a central concept
that regards the fairness of a cost distribution among members
of a collaborative agent group by taking into account their
contributions to the collaborative group. In this work, we
follow Shapley’s view and expect a fair allocation to satisfy the
following four properties: efficiency, symmetry, dummy player,
and additivity (as discussed in Section II-C). In brief, if a
group G follows an efficient method to allocate cost C among
its members, the summation of allocated costs to members of
group G will be equal to C. The symmetry property says that
agents that make the same contribution to the total cost, should
be allocated the same individual cost shares. The dummy player
property says that if the presence of an agent A does not
result in any cost reduction (in all the possible agent groups),
the allocated cost to A should be equal to its individual total
traditional cost. Finally, the additivity property says that if you
combine two games V and U , the allocated cost to an agent
A (involved in both the games) should be the sum of the costs
allocated to A in the individual games, i.e., playing more than
once does not lead to any (dis)advantages for A. For formal
axiomatization of these properties, we refer the reader to [26].
In the following, we present our tailored Shapley value for ISR
games.
Definition 5 (Shapley Allocation for ISRs). Let σ be an
ISR game (as defined in Definition 3) between firms A
and B. The Shapley allocation for σ is the tuple Φ(σ) :=
〈TΦA (σ), TΦB (σ)〉 where for i ∈ N = {A,B} we have
TΦi (σ) =
1
2 [T (σ) + Ti(σ¯)− TN\{i}(σ¯)].
A reader familiar with the notion of Shapley value might
expect the two notions of orders and marginal contributions
to be a part of our tailored concept of Shapley value for
ISRs. We highlight that due to our domain of application, i.e,
bilateral industrial relations, there are two possible orders in
ISR games (reflected by the constant value 12 ). Moreover, the
marginal contribution of a given firm i ∈ N = {A,B} can be
reformulated in terms of the most desirable stable cost for i and
the most undesirable one, i.e., Ui(σ) = T (σ)−TN\{i}(σ¯) and
Ti(σ¯), respectively. Note that as the Shapley value is defined
following a constructive method (in contrast to condition-based
definition of core in Definition 4), the existence of the Shapley
value for any arbitrary ISR game is guaranteed. Following
our discussion about the fairness of collaborations, the next
property shows that the Shapley value is the unique fair method
for allocation of the total ISR-related operational cost in ISR
games.
Proposition 3 (Uniqueness of the Shapley Value). Let
Φ(σ) be the Shapley allocation for ISR game σ between firms
A and B. For any fair allocation of costs in σ, denoted by
Φ′(σ), we have that Φ′(σ) = Φ(σ).
Proof: Importing results from [26], we have that for any
cooperative game, the Shapley value is the unique allocation
method that satisfies all the four properties of fair cost alloca-
tions, i.e., efficiency, symmetry, dummy player, and additivity,
regardless of the characteristics of the cost function of the
game. Accordingly, the uniqueness property holds for ISR
games as two-person cost allocation games.
Considering core of ISR games and their unique Shapley
allocation, the following proposition relates these two forms
of solution concepts and shows that in ISR games the Shapley
allocation is in the core.
Proposition 4 (Membership in the Core). Let Ψ(σ) and
Φ(σ) be respectively the set of core allocations, and the
Shapley allocation for ISR game σ between firms A and B. It
always holds that Φ(σ) ∈ Ψ(σ).
Proof: Based on [13, 26], the core of submodular games
is nonempty and includes the Shapley value. For ISR games,
according to Proposition 2, the core is nonempty. Thus, we
have that for any ISR game σ, it holds that Φ(σ) ∈ Ψ(σ).
Note that the membership of the Shapley allocation in the
core is a property of ISR games and not a general property
of the Shapley cost allocation for any class of cooperative
games. Accordingly, we have that the Shapley allocation of
any ISR game can be illustrated in two dimensional space.
More precisely, the Shapley allocation γ (see Figure 2) is the
midpoint of the core allocation segment.
Example 2 (Allocations in the ISR Scenario). Considering
the presented scenario in Example 1, any cost allocation
〈TA, TB〉 such that 4 ≤ TA ≤ 7 and 8 ≤ TB ≤ 11 and
TA + TB = 15 is a core allocation. Moreover, 〈5.5, 9.5〉 is
the Shapley allocation.
In general, Shapley allocation does not satisfy the individ-
ual rationality property. I.e., it might be the case that some
agents in a collaborative group should pay higher than their
traditional cost in order to guarantee the fairness property.
In such cases, we have a fair albeit unstable collaboration
because any sacrificing firm has incentive to rationally defect
the collaboration. However, the next proposition shows that for
ISR games, the Shapley allocation is individually rational.
Proposition 5 (Fairness and Stability). Let Φ(σ) be the
Shapley allocation for ISR game σ between firms A and
B. It always holds that for i ∈ {A,B}, we have that
TΦi (σ) ≤ Ti(σ¯).
Proof: According to Proposition 4, the Shapley allocation
of ISR game σ is also a core allocation. Hence, it also satisfies
the individual rationality condition in Definition 4.
Based on proposition 5, in case the two firms agree to
implement the Shapley allocation, it is guaranteed that the
relation will be both fair and stable. Although implementing
the Shapley allocation seems natural due to its desirable prop-
erties, firms may prefer to negotiate among cost allocations
in the core with the aim to practice their bargaining power
and enjoy more cost reduction. However, industrial agents that
suffer from unfair allocations in such cases may defect the
collaboration, leave/reject the ISR, and join other ISRs that
are practicing fair allocation methods.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we present a game-theoretical representation
of Industrial Symbiotic Relations (ISRs) and tailor two types
of solution concepts for cost allocation in such relations, i.e.,
core allocation and Shapley allocation for ISR games. These
two notions can also be seen as two approaches for decision
support while firms are faced with the collaboration decision,
to reject or accept an ISR proposal. This is by enabling firms
to systematically reason about and verify stability and fairness
of a particular ISR. Range of stable collaborations, provided
by the concept of core, allows further negotiation while the
Shapley allocation leads to a uniquely fair solution. We then
show that due to the characteristics of industrial symbiotic
relations, ISR games can always be operationalized in both a
fair and stable manner. In addition to practical contributions
by providing managerial decision support tools, we introduced
ISR games as a new class of two-person Operations Research
(OR) games. In ISR games, we have the non-emptiness of the
core and it is guaranteed that the Shapley value in this class
of OR games is an individually rational solution. As a future
work, we aim to analyze the validity of presented results using
multiagent-based simulations [31]. We also plan to extend our
game-theoretical analysis to network level, relate our notions
to the concept of willingness to cooperate [32], and study
Industrial Symbiotic Networks (ISNs). Due to complexities
of ISNs (see [14]) guaranteeing fairness and stability in such
networks calls for mechanisms to coordinate agent interactions
[33] and governance platforms for, as discussed in [34],
“administration of stakeholders by stakeholders”.
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